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Abstract. We first analyze the orthodoxy of the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board (1966-
1973) through analysis of legislation and statistical tests based on balance sheet data. We 
then compare an analysis of economic factors such as wage growth, inflation rate, etc. 
during the currency board period to the post-currency board period. We also provide the 
history of the currency board’s issue of notes. A companion spreadsheet workbook shows 
the board’s note issue, balance sheet, and other data in machine-readable form.  
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1. Introduction 
he Qatar and Dubai Currency Board was established on 21 March 1966 and 
lasted until 19 May 1973. Prior to the establishment of the currency board, 
the Arabian Gulf Currency Agreement had been signed on July 1965 by the 
rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain, and Qatar to provide a joint currency across 
all four jurisdictions. Due todelays in the implementation of the agreement, Qatar 
and Dubai decided to form their own currency without Abu Dhabi or Bahrain. The 
Qatar-Dubai riyalwould replace the Gulf rupee (described in more detail below) 
that had been in circulation throughout the Persian Gulf since 1959.  
The number of accessible secondary sources for this period is almost negligible. 
The only primary sources available are the annual reports published by the Qatar 
and Dubai Currency Board, and the Persian Gulf Gazette, an official publication 
issued by the British Political Resident, an official who supervises the British 
protectorates Qatar, Dubai, and the Trucial States (now the United Arab Emirates). 
To conduct a quantitative analysis of the Board, we have made the important 
data available in machine-readable form. We provide acompanion spreadsheet 
workbook containing useful items regarding the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board 
that we found in its annual reports from 1966 to 1972. (No annual report for 1973 
exists since the Board dissolved partway through the year.) 
We focus on determining the extent to which the Qatar and Dubai Currency 
Board operated as an orthodox currency board in its short span ofseven years. We 
do so by performing various statistical tests on the balance sheet items, along with 
analyzing the legislation associated with the currency board. We do not address 
whether there were alternatives to the currency board that might have led to better 
(or worse) economic growth during the period the currency board was active. This 
paper isthe first detailed analysis ofthe history of the Qatar and Dubai Currency 
Board. (Symes 1997 focuses on the aspect of the board of most interest to currency 
collectors, not economists.)We hope that it will be useful in future studies ofQatar 
or Dubai’s economic history. 
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2. Origins and workings of the Currency Board’s note issue, 
1965-1966 
Qatar and Dubai were two separate states of the Persian Gulf, but were both 
administered as British protectorates until 1971. In the absence of locally issued 
currencies, the Indian rupee had long circulated throughout the Persian Gulf 
because of the region’s trade links with India, which had likewise been part of the 
British Empire until achieving independence in 1947. In 1959 the government of 
India introduced the Gulf rupeeto segregate the Indian rupee within India from its 
use in other territories.  The Gulf rupee was only valid for use outside of India. It 
therefore made exchange control easier for India by disconnecting the internal and 
external circulation of the rupee.The unusual status of the Gulf rupee also made it 
less attractive for the Gulf states to continue using it. In 1961, Kuwait became the 
first Gulf state to introduce its own currency, issued by a currency board. Qatar and 
Dubai followed suit several years later. 
The Qatar and Dubai riyal was set equivalent to 1 shilling 6 pence sterling (13-
1/3 riyals = £1), with a parity of 0.186621 grams of gold. At the time the currency 
board was established, this rate made the riyal equivalent to both the Gulf rupee 
and the Indian rupee. On 6 June 1966, though, the Indian rupeewas devalued to 
approximately 21.05 rupees per pound sterling. At the time, the orders for Qatar 
and Dubai riyalnotes and coins had been placed in the United Kingdom but the 
notes and coins had not been received. Hence, for the time being Qatar and Dubai 
continued to use the Gulf rupee. The devaluation of the Indian rupee adversely 
affected the Gulf rupee. To protect their countries from those effects, the rulers of 
Qatar and Dubai thought it would be best for the banks to continue conducting 
business in Gulf rupees at pre-devaluation exchange rates. To give banks the 
incentive to do so, the rulers guaranteed that the Gulf rupeesthen circulating in 
Qatar and Dubai would be exchanged into the new currency (the Qatar and Dubai 
riyal) also at pre-devaluation rates. 
However, to safeguard Gulf rupees from speculation, the governments of Qatar 
and Dubai withdrew them from circulation at the end of June 1966. For the period 
until the Qatar and Dubai riyals arrived, the government of Qatar established an 
agreement with the SaudiArabian Monetary Agency, borrowing notes totaling 100 
million Saudi Arabian riyals against the collateral of sterling deposits in London. 
By the end of June 1966 the Saudi riyals were in circulation in Qatar and Dubai, 
the rate of exchange being 106.5 Gulf rupees for 100 Saudi Arabian riyals. (That 
was the parity rate between the two currencies.) 
The Qatar-Dubai Currency Agreement, signed on 21 March 1966, was amended 
on 31 August 1966. There were two important changes in the amended agreement. 
One was that the references to Gulf rupees were replaced by references to Saudi 
riyals. This provision allowed the holders of Saudi riyals to exchange their 
holdings into the new currency. The other change was inthe amount of currency 
cover provided by the two governments. Payments of £6 million by the 
government of Qatar and £2.5 million by the government of Dubai were 
established under the amended agreement (QCCB 1966, Article 27: 17-18).All the 
expenditure incurred and all the revenue earned by the Qatar and Dubai Currency 
Boardwere debited and credited respectively to the Currency Fund Income 
Account, the main accounting vehicle for the Currency Board. The net surplus in 
the Currency Fund Income Account was transferred to the Currency Reserve Fund 
at the end of each financial year (QCCB 1966, Article 30: 19). If the Board was 
satisfied with the amount in the Currency Reserve Fund such that it guaranteed the 
redemption of currency notes and coins not less than 100 percent and contained in 
addition assets equivalent to 10 percent of the value of currency in circulation, then 
it would pay any excess amount to the two participating governments. Payment 
would be proportional to the amount paid by the participating government to the 
Currency Reserve Fund (QCCB 1966, Article 36: 20-21). 
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Qatar and Dubai riyals started arriving by the middle of September 1966, 
allowing banks to issue the new currency in exchange for the Saudi riyals under the 
determined rate, i.e., 106.5 Qatar and Dubai riyals for 100 Saudi riyals. The 
amount of local currency exchangedfor Saudi riyals was 74,859,640 Qatar and 
Dubai riyals. The sterling equivalent for this amount, £5,614,473, was paid solely 
by the government of Qatar to the Currency Board. This resulted in the 
governments of Qatar and Dubai signing a supplementary agreement on 29 
October 1966. Under the supplementary agreement, the government of Qatar was 
made responsible for any losses in the Currency Reserve Fund under Article 35 and 
entitled to all profits under Article 36 (QCCB 1966, Appendix 3: 37-38).   
Data provided by the board (QDCB 1966: 40-41) show that there were few 
redemptions of and frequent issues with the new currency. A possible 
explanationcould be that those who had paid in notes during the exchange period 
(switching from Saudi riyals to Qatar and Dubai riyals) later slowly drew cash 
from their accounts. This could have been due to the lack of trust by the population 
in the new currency. Banks may have also been inclined to keep smaller cash 
holdings due to liberal regulations issued by the Currency Board. 
The Currency Board charged a commission of 0.125 percent on issues and 
redemption of Qatar and Dubai currency (payable in sterling in London at the rate 
of 1.5 shillings sterling for 1 QDR). The minimum amount for such transactions 
was set at 1 million Qatar and Dubai riyals (£75,000) (QCCB 1966, Appendix 4: 
39). 
There were five members that composed the Board of Directors of the Currency 
Board, with Qatar and Dubai each appointing two directors (one of them being the 
chairman) and the fifth director being a technical member from a country outside 
of the Currency Area (appointed jointly by the rulers of the Qatar and Dubai).The 
chairman and other board of directors were appointed for a period of no more than 
two years and were eligible for re-appointment. Z. Siemienski (Zbigniew 
Siemienski, a Polish economist specializing in money and banking) was the 
technical member of the board from 1966-1973. The Board was expected to meet 
at least twice each calendar year and upon any other situation when the Qatar 
and/or Dubai government(s) deemed meeting necessary. The quorum for a meeting 
was three directors,including the chairman, the technical member, and a director 
that represented a different government than the chairman. The Board took 
decisions based on a simple majority of votesand the chairman could only vote to 
break ties (QCCB 1966, Article 6: 13-14). 
 
3. Economic conditions in Qatar and Dubai 
Qatar’s crude oil production in the decade ended 1973 increased at a rate of 
11.7 percent annually to 208.1 million barrels (570,137 barrels daily). Qatar’s 
revenue system in the 1970s was mainly dominated by oil receipts, which 
comprised more than 90 percent of the budget revenue. Due to increased oil output 
in the decade ended 1970, oil receipts grew at a rate of 10.2 percent annually 
(QMFR May 1977: 1).   
Oil in Dubai was discovered in 1966, and its revenue did not pour in until 1969. 
Most of the revenue generated from oil was invested in infrastructure development. 
Prior to that Dubai’s economy was based mainly on trade with other countries in 
the Gulf region. Dubai’s population increased rapidly during this period as many 
workers from nearby countries immigratedto Dubai due to increased demand for 
labor. 
 
4. The Currency Board year by year, 1967-19721 
 
1 The narrative in this section comes from the annual reports of the Currency Board. Because it is 
obvious what information comes from what years, and the narrative portion of the annual reports is 
brief, what follows generally omits citations. 
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1967. The most important event that took place in the year 1967 was the 
devaluation of sterling by 14.3 percent on 18 November 1967. Since there had 
already been two currency changes in the past 18 months, the governments of 
Qatar and Dubai took action to prevent further loss of confidence in the local 
currency arising from devaluation against third currencies. Therefore, the gold 
value of the Qatar and Dubai riyalremained unchanged at 0.186621 grams whereas 
its value in terms of sterling was increased, making the exchange rate 1 shilling 9 
pence sterling, or approximately 11.43 riyals = £1.These decisions made it 
necessary to mark downthe sterling assets, which resulted in a loss of 14.9 
millionriyals. A revision to the minimum amount of currency that the Currency 
Board was allowed to issue in a transaction was made by increasing the issue level 
to £87,500. 
Nevertheless, currency in circulation in Qatar and Dubai increased by 53 
percent over the year, primarily because of increased precautionary demand to hold 
cash as a result of the Arab-Israeli war ofJune 1967. As is visible in the companion 
workbook, there had been a high level of redemptions, which might at first be 
taken as signaling that the circulation in Dubai was falling. That was not the case, 
however, as the Qatar and Dubai riyal was also a major currency in other Gulf 
states (QCCB 1967: 2).  
It is worth emphasizing that the Currency Board’s decision not to devalue 
against third currencies with the pound sterling was unusual, but not unique. 
Singapore and Brunei, which also had currency boards, refused to devalue for the 
same reason as Qatar and Dubai. Unlike most other currency boards of the time, 
the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board had two anchors, gold and the pound sterling, 
and had to choose between them. It chose gold as the anchor but retained a link 
with the pound sterling by continuing to use sterling rather than gold as the 
currency for which it issued and redeemed riyals. Its policy was consistent with the 
international monetary system of the time, in which members of the International 
Monetary Fund declared gold parities for their currencies. If they allowed 
redemption of their currencies in gold, however, it was only allowed for central 
banks, and even then often only occasionally and grudgingly. 
The consolidated balance sheets provided by the banks in Qatar and Dubai 
show enormous growth in the banking system, visible in rising amounts of local 
discounts, private deposits and advances. Growth in local discounts and advances 
shows greater utilization of financial resources(banks) by the population of the two 
states, showcasing the increase in confidence by the local population in the banks.  
At the end of 1967, the Currency Board held 23.2 millionriyals worth of gold 
and 27.9 million riyals worth of short-dated British government securities, equal to 
17.7 percent and 21.3 percent respectively of total currency in circulation. The 
balance of the Currency Board’s assets, 73.0 million riyals, equal to 55.9 percent of 
currency in circulation, was invested in highly liquid British Treasury bills. The 
Currency Fund Income Account showed a profit of nearly 900,000riyals for the 
year (equal to 7.28 percent of the average total assets). 
In 1967, the market value of British government securities held by the Currency 
Board fell below their cost as the Bank of England increased its policy rate to the 
unusually high level of 8 percent. The Currency Board valued these securities at 
market value on the balance sheet, but because it usually held them until maturity, 
the decline did not truly inflict losses on their final value. 
1968. In 1968, the Directors of the Currency Board made two major decisions. 
In January, they decided to diversify the Board’s assets, which they achieved by 
reducing the proportion of sterling holdings and purchasing assets denominated in 
other foreign currencies. The rationale of the step was to lower the risk of further 
devaluation of sterling. Hence, sterling was reduced to 50 percent in the external 
reserves by the end of July, with 28 percentin other foreign currencies (U.S.dollars 
and Swiss francs) and 22 percentin gold. In September, the Currency Board signed 
the Sterling Guarantee Agreement with Britain. Under this agreement, the 
Currency Board was required to maintain the existing proportion of sterling in its 
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external reserves, and the British government in return guaranteedthe Board’s 
sterling reserves (in U.S.dollars) against the risk of depreciation of sterling (against 
the dollar). This decision arrested further diversification of external reserves. 
The consolidated balance sheets of banks in Qatar and Dubai in 1968 showed a 
75 percent increase in deposits for the year and a rise in total assets of the banks in 
Dubai by approximately 700 million riyals. This again points out to Dubai’s 
significance as a Gulf trading center. The assets of banks in Qatar, along with 
demand deposits, time deposits, advances and discounts increased as well over the 
course of the year. The banks in both states also considerably increased their 
foreign reserves to increase residual liquidity. 
At the end of 1968, the Currency Board had 30.8 million riyals worth of gold 
and 79.7 million riyals worth of short-dated British government securities, 
representing 21.0 percent and 54.4 percent, respectively, of total currency in 
circulation. The Currency Fund Income Account showed a profit of 7.3 
millionriyals for the year ended (equal to 59.01 percent of the average total assets). 
Also, since the Currency Board’s Swiss franc and U.S. dollar holdings were 
invested as time deposits with foreign banks, the Board’s cash with foreign banks 
increased as compared to 1967. 
British Government securities were henceforthvalued on the balance sheet at 
cost, rather than at market value as they had been in 1967. The high interest rates in 
London in 1967 that had led to the market value of the securities being less than the 
cost came down in 1968. 
1969. The strength of the Qatar and Dubai riyal was a major reason for the 
strength of the banking systems in both states. There was no effect on the activities 
of the Currency Board or the banks when international currency markets 
experienced crises in 1969 from the devaluation of the French franc in August and 
the revaluation of the Deutsche Mark in October. The fluctuation of total external 
assets was low in 1969, hence, the investment policy formulated by the Currency 
Board in 1968 continued during 1969.There was an increase in foreign liabilities of 
commercial banks as local residents depositedmore external assets in relation to the 
Qatar and Dubai riyals. Foreign currencies offered higher interest rates than the 
riyal, though accompanied by higher exchange rate risk. 
At the end of 1969, the Currency Fund Income Account showed a profit of 8.9 
million riyals(equal to 71.95 percent of average total assets). Also, since the Board 
followed the previous year’s investment strategy, there was no fundamental change 
in the Board’s assets. 
1970. In 1970, there was no need for a major change in the composition of the 
Board’s foreign exchange holdings. The fact that Qatar and Dubai riyal was backed 
by holdings of external assets, equal to around 110 percent of the currency in 
circulation, contributed to continued confidence in the currency. Thevolume of 
banking business grew and the banking network expanded. Over the year, there 
was strong growth in advances to finance local economic activities and foreign 
assets held by the banks. 
At the end of 1970, the Currency Fund Income Account showed a profit of 11.0 
millionriyals (equal to 88.93 percent of average total assets). The increase in profit 
was mainly due to larger average holding of external assets and higher interest 
rates on the international money markets. 
1971. Due to speculation against the U.S. dollar and a record balance of 
payment deficits in the United States, international foreign exchange markets 
experienced what for the time were enormous fluctuations. A drain of gold reserves 
led the United Statesto suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold and to 
impose a surcharge on imports on August 15. On December 15 the dollar was 
officially devalued by 7.89 percent in terms of gold, though in practice it was still 
not redeemable into gold. However, none of this affected the value of the Qatar and 
Dubai riyal, whose gold parity remained unchanged. Issues and redemptions 
continued to be effected in sterling at the same rate of exchange. 
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As the end of 1970 had approached, so had the maturity of the dollar term 
deposits in which the Board had invested. The Board decided to gradually switch 
into other currencies, hence, at the time of the devaluation of dollar in 1971, the 
Board held no dollar assets. The proportion of sterling holdings correspondingly 
increased from 32.2 percent in 1970 to 56.9 percent at the end of 1971. Among 
commercial banks, there was a substantial increase in deposits denominated in 
local currency both in Qatar and Dubai, whereas the increase in deposits 
denominated in foreign currency was relatively small (primarily due to currency 
uncertainties in the foreign markets). Following the further increase in number of 
banks in both Qatar and Dubai, banks expanded their advances and discounts to 
local businesses and increased their holdings of external assets. 
At the end of 1971, the Currency Fund Income Account showed a profit of 11.1 
million riyals (equal to 89.73 percent of the average total assets). The increase in 
profit despite falling interest rates in the international money markets is due to 
higher average level of assets that the Board had along with exchange profits on 
holdings of Deutsche Marks and Swiss francs that the Board possessed. 
On 2 September 1971 Qatar achieved full independence from Britain as a 
sovereign state, and on 2 December 1971 Dubai achieved independence from 
Britain as a member of the United Arab Emirates. However, the actions of the 
Currency Board remained unchanged in both Qatar and Dubai. 
1972. The re-emergence of speculative capital movements connected with 
further stresses in the international monetary system of the period prompted the 
British government in June 1972to announce a supposedly temporary measure that 
the exchange rate of sterling would float. The value of sterling in dollars and other 
currencies declined. To maintain the gold parity of the riyal, the Board decided that 
it would set the exchange rates for issues and redemptions of currency in sterling 
from day to day. To reduce the effect of large fluctuations in the value of sterling, 
the Board widened its exchange rate spread to 0.5 percent on either side of the 
middle rate, or 1 percent total. The Board also stopped charging the usual 
commission of 0.125 percent on issues and redemptions. 
The Board again had to face substantial losses in its sterling holding due to its 
depreciation. The Sterling Guarantee Agreement was designed to come into effect 
when the sterling-dollar rate depreciated below the $2.40level that had prevailed 
since 1967. Due to the devaluation of the dollar in 1971, the sterling-dollar rate 
hadchanged to $2.6057. So, when sterling depreciated, the Board could not claim 
compensation from the British government until the rate fell below $2.40. This 
happened in October, and on November 23 the Board became eligible for 
compensation under the Agreement. The compensation amounted to nearly 2.8 
million riyals, based on the difference between $2.40 and the closing middle rate of 
$2.3506. This amount covered a part of the loss suffered by the Board. 
The Board made no changes in its investment policy. However, an increase in 
currency circulation affected total holdings of external assets, reflected ina rise in 
sterling holdings. The increase in circulation was due to the rising economic 
activity in Qatar and Dubai along with the continued confidence of the currency’s 
stability in turbulent times. There was also a large increase in deposits denominated 
in local currency at commercial banks. 
At the end of 1972, the Currency Fund Income Account showed a surplus of 
10.1 million riyals (equal to 81.65 percent of the average total assets).Earnings on 
sterling assets were high due to the rise in interest rates in London after June 1972 
along with increase in Board’s sterling holdings. However, low interest rates on 
Swiss franc and Deutsche Mark deposits meant that they did not yield great profits. 
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5. The end of the Currency Board, 1973 
As previously explained, Dubai became an emirate in the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.) on 2 December 1971. Following this event, the U.A.E. authorities took 
steps to establish a unified and independent currency system, which was completed 
by the issue of the U.A.E. dirham on 19 May 1973. Therefore, Qatar and Dubai 
signed an agreement on 9 May 1973 ending the Qatar-Dubai Currency Agreement 
of 1966.The new U.A.E. monetary authority, called the United Arab Emirates 
Currency Board, was established on 19 May 1973.Despite its name, it was actually 
a central bank: its minimum foreign reserve ratio was 70 percent of the monetary 
base, not 100 percent, and it lent to banks(United Arab Emirates Currency Board 
annual report 1977: 15-16, 24, 27). It was converted into the United Arab Emirates 
Central Bank, which had still more typical central banking characteristics, in 1980. 
On 19 May 1973 the Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA) took over all the assets and 
liabilities of the Qatar-Dubai Currency Board. The redemption of Qatar and Dubai 
riyals was completed within 90-day period, beginning from 19 May 1973. The 
Qatar riyal was issued with the same gold content as the Qatar and Dubai riyals. 
Even though QMA had the powers of a traditional central bank, the QMA law 
stipulatedthat the agency must maintain a reserve of external assets equal to 100 
percent of the currency in circulation (QMFR May 1977: 3-4). The Qatar Central 
Bank, the current monetary authority, replaced the QMA on 5 August 1993. 
The Qatar Monetary Agency’s annual report does not state any reason why the 
government of Qatar wanted to establish a more activist monetary authority. 
 
6. To what extent was the Qatar-Dubai currency agreement a 
Currency Board? A first cut 
An orthodox currency board has a fixed exchange rate between the local 
currency and a foreign currency, maintains net foreign assets that are 100 percent 
or slightly more of the board’s total monetary base, and provides full convertibility 
with the anchor foreign currency (Hanke 2002: 205). To what extent did the Qatar 
and Dubai Currency Board actually possess these characteristics during the period 
1966-1973? 
The Qatar and Dubai Currency Board maintained a constant official exchange 
rate in terms of gold. It used the pound sterling, however, as its intervention 
currency in foreign exchange markets. Since sterling and the dollar fluctuated with 
respect to gold, the riyal’s exchange rate fluctuated too. During 1966-1967, 1 
riyal= 1.5 shillings sterling = 0.186621 gram of gold. Even though the Qatar and 
Dubai riyal had an official exchange rate in terms of gold, gold was not the de facto 
anchor currency. From late 1967 to mid 1972, the anchor currency was the pound 
sterling, at 1 riyal = 1.75 shillings sterling = 0.186621 gram of gold. During the 
second half of 1972, as mentioned earlier, the pound sterling started to float. The 
Currency Board then switched to the U.S. dollar as the de facto anchor currency at 
1 riyal = US$0.228. 
It might seem unclear from the above paragraphs whether the Qatar and Dubai 
Currency Board was actually an orthodox currency board for the whole of its life. 
Hence, to better understand and determine the orthodoxy of the Qatar and Dubai 
Currency Board (1966-1973), we will now perform certain statistical tests on the 
collected data in the companion workbook. 
 
7. The data and tests 
We digitized annual balance sheet data on the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board 
from 1966 to 1972. The only primary source available to us was the Qatar and 
Dubai Currency Board annual report. The report had all the necessary data from 
1966-1972 to digitize balance sheets, so we were able to run various analytical tests 
on the Qatar-Dubai Currency Board. No data were available for 1973 as both Qatar 
and Dubai were transitioning out of the currency board in that year. 
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7.1. Domestic assets  
For a currency board to be considered orthodox, it is imperative that the 
percentage value of its domestic assets as a share of total assets should be close to 
zero. Usually, a small amount of domestic assets is held by the board in order to 
pay for staff salaries, etc., but that is all. 
 
 
Figure 1. Domestic Assets 
 
Figure 1 shows that the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board wasan orthodox 
currency board by this measure. Even in 1972 its domestic assets, though larger 
than before, remained below 2 percent of the total. The reason for the increase was 
that in 1972, sterling started floating. The depreciation of sterling relative to gold 
inflicted a substantial loss on the Board, hence the Board decided to sell its sterling 
holdings during that year. The Board parked some of the proceeds in local assets, 
as can be seen from the data in the companion workbook. 
 
7.2. Foreign assets and the monetary base 
As previously stated, an orthodox currency board maintains foreign assets of 
100 percent or slightly higher of the monetary base, formed ofits notes and the 
coins in circulation plus demand deposits, if any. The graph (Figure 2) shows the 
amount of net foreign assets held by the Currency Board as a percentage of the 
monetary base annually from 1966 to 1972. 
In the graph, net foreign assets is the sum of gold reserves, foreign securities, 
compensation received under the Sterling Guarantee Act, and interest due but not 
received (which was overwhelmingly interest deriving from foreign assets). Since 
there were no foreign liabilities, net foreign assets were equal to gross foreign 
assets. 
 
 
Figure 2. Foreign assets and the monetary base 
 
As mentioned in the 1970 annual report of the Currency Board, the strength of 
the currency was due to external assets backing no less than 110 percent of the 
currency in circulation. The graph shows that the foreign reserves as a percentage 
of the monetary base were always higher than 100 percent during the period the 
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Currency Board was active. There is a steep increase in external asset 
coveragefrom 1967 to 1970 because the circulation of the currency grew strongly 
during the period, the backing grew, and the Board distributed as profits all assets 
in excess of 100 percent of the monetary base. Another reason for the strong 
growth is that, in 1967, sterling was devalued by 14.3 percent, the Board decided to 
change its investment strategy, and the new strategy generated higher returns. 
In 1971, the U.S. dollar was affected by fluctuations in the international 
exchange market. Hence, at the end of the year (when the Board’s dollar term 
deposits were reaching maturity) the Board decided to switch some assets back into 
sterling. That is why there is a downward slope from 1970 to 1971. The further 
decline in the percentageof net foreign assets in 1972 is due to the losses arising 
when sterling floated and depreciated against other currencies and gold. 
 
7.3. Foreign assets and the monetary base 
Another test of the orthodoxy of a currency board is the reserve pass-through 
ratio — the year-over-year change in the monetary base of a board compared to the 
annual change in the foreign assets held by the board. For anorthodox currency 
board, this ratio should be around 100 percentfor the reason that any change in the 
monetary base must be mirrored by a change in the foreign assets in order to 
maintain a backing of around 100 percent (Hanke 2008: 57). 
 
 
Figure 3. Foreign assets and the monetary base 
 
Figure 3shows that that the reserve pass-through ratio fluctuatedgreatly during 
the Qatar-Dubai Currency Board’s life. When we ran tests 1 and 2, the Board 
proved to be orthodox; Figure 3 suggests that it was not. However, it is important 
to understand that especially for small currency boards such as that of Qatar and 
Dubai during 1966-1973, minor fluctuations in the market value or market cost of 
securities, or the timing of expenditures and receipts, can strongly affect the reserve 
pass-through ratio. Therefore, to further test the orthodoxy of the board we 
analyzed the monetary base and foreign assets in a different way, by comparing the 
annual change in monetary base to that in the foreign reserves. 
 
 
Figure 4. Annual change in monetary base and foreign reserves 
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Figure 4 shows that theannual changes in the monetary base and annual changes 
in net foreign assets were close and moved in the same direction in every year of 
data. Net foreign assets grew faster than the monetary base in each year except 
1972. When recalling that sterling was allowed to float freely in 1972, leading to its 
depreciation against the riyal and hence the depreciation of the Currency Board’s 
sterling assets, the data in Figure 4suggest that the Board was orthodox. 
 
7.4. A note on profitability 
The chief financial advantage of a currency board for a government over 
dollarization or free banking (private, competitive currency issue by banks and 
possibly other firms) is that a currency board generates profits for the government. 
To check if the Board was profitable during 1966-1973, we calculated the net 
revenue,profit as a share of total assets. The profit generated by the Board was the 
balance transferred to the Special Reserve Fund (difference in amount between the 
Currency Reserve Fund and the currency in circulation) in the expenditure 
statement.  
 
 
Figure 5. Net revenue (% of total assets) 
 
As Figure 5 shows, the Board was profitable throughout its existence. The 
profitability of the Board was low during 1966 because it only operated for part of 
the year and it was just coming into existence. Hence, there was an added cost for 
creating a new stock of notes and coins. This can be verified by looking at the 
expenditure statement for 1966 in the companion workbook. The following year, 
sterling was devalued, reducing the value of the Board’s assets in riyal terms. Thus, 
1967 was also a year of low profitability. 
The Currency Board changed its investment portfolio in 1968, and, since the 
portfolio maintained almost the same composition until 1971,the new strategy 
seems to have worked well for the Board. The decrease in profits in 1972 arose 
from the effects of the floating of sterling, discussed previously. 
We avoided using any tests related to terms of monetization, tests related to 
currency held by the public and the banks, because we believe year-over-year 
comparisons of currency in circulation among the banks and the public is not of 
great use for determining the trends in the economies of Qatar and Dubai during 
this period. The data we have are based on the Gregorian calendar, whereas 
patterns of cash holding were apparently more closely linked to the Islamic 
calendar, whose month ends vary in relation to those of the Gregorian calendar 
(QCCB 1967: 2). 
 
7.5. GDP Growth rate comparison – Qatar and Kuwait (1966-1972) 
To get a general idea about the success of the Qatar and DubaiCurrency Board 
with respect to its role in the wider economy, we compare Qatar to Kuwait. Both 
were small economies heavily dependent on oil exports. The GDP growth rate of 
Qatar was higher than that of Kuwait during the period Qatar and Dubai’s currency 
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board was active, except in 1967,suggesting at the very least that the currency 
board was not a hindrance to growth. 
 
 
Figure 6. GDP growth rate comparison 
 
We chose Kuwait for the comparisonbecause the GDP data for other 
comparable Middle Eastern countrieswas not easily available for the period 1966-
1972. The growth rate calculations can be accessed through the companion 
workbook. As previously mentioned, Kuwait established a currency board in 1961. 
It replaced the currency board with a central bank in 1969. 
 
8. Conclusion 
By examining the legislation upon which the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board 
(1966-1973) was built, it is certain that it was intended to behave as an orthodox 
currency board during the period it was active. The annual reports stated that the 
Board planned to maintain 110 percentforeign assets backing.  
The data from the statistical tests of currency board orthodoxy aremixed. 
Domestic assets were low, indicating orthodoxy.  The reserve pass-through ratio 
was volatile and often far from 100 percent. We cannot claim that the data are 
inaccurate because there are nomissing data; everything is accounted for in the 
annual reports.  
On balance, though, if we take account of the factors(such as fluctuations in the 
international markets, etc.) associated with certain years during which the Board 
was active, the reserve pass-through test seems to be an outlier and we can see that 
the Qatar and Dubai Currency Board was actually an orthodox currency board. Not 
only was it orthodox, it was also profitable and promoted growth of the financial 
system, as seen by the net revenue and the expansion of the banking system in 
Qatar and Dubai during the 1970s.  
Postscript: Companion Spreadsheet Workbook 
An accompanying spreadsheet workbook contains all the important data, graphs 
and calculations associated with this paper. The workbook also contains data 
digitized but not used in the paper, which may be useful to other researchers. 
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